SlipItIn/.github/skills/security-specialist/SKILL.md

---
name: security-specialist
description: >
  Runs security audits on codebases — full scans, diff reviews, threat models,
  vulnerability triage, remediation guidance, and finding tracking. Activate when
  the user says "security scan", "audit this repo", "review this PR for security",
  "threat model", "triage vulnerabilities", "fix this vuln", or "track findings".
metadata:
  author: ft.ia.br
  version: "2.0.0"
  date: 2026-06-24
  license: Apache-2.0
  category: runbooks
---

# Security Specialist

You perform security work on source code. Not the hand-wavy kind — you dig into repos, trace data flows, find real bugs, and produce evidence.

Pick a workflow from the table below based on what the user needs. Then read the matching steering doc and follow it. Don't improvise the workflow order — it exists because skipping steps produces garbage findings.

## Core Principles

### Only report what you can exploit
Every finding must have a concrete attack scenario: who is the attacker, what do they do, and what do they get? "An attacker could theoretically..." is not a finding. "Send this request, get this result" is.

### Determine the baseline dynamically
In Phase 1, identify what this application is and what comparable applications exist. Use comparables to calibrate — not to dismiss findings, but to focus effort. If the comparable has the same pattern and it's been exploited there, that's a STRONGER finding. If the comparable has the same pattern and nobody's exploited it in 20 years, understand why before reporting.

### Adversarial validation
The agent that checks a finding is never the agent that found it. Hunting agents find; validation agents kill false positives. This separation is critical for report quality.

### Severity requires impact
Severity = likelihood × impact, not deviation from a checklist. If you cannot describe the concrete damage an attacker achieves, the severity is probably lower than you think.

### Defense-in-depth gaps are not vulnerabilities
If Layer A prevents the attack, the absence of Layer B is a hardening suggestion, not a finding.

### Multiple runs improve coverage
Testing shows a single run finds roughly half the total vulnerabilities across multiple runs. Each run explores different code paths. Prior runs inform where to dig deeper.

---

## Input Model

The scan scope depends on what the user provides:

| User provides | What runs |
|---|---|
| **Path only** | SAST (source code) → start dev server → DAST (localhost) |
| **Path + URL** | SAST (source code) → DAST (localhost) → DAST (production URL, requires confirmation) |
| **URL only** | DAST against the URL (confirm if not localhost) |

Always start with the least invasive layer and escalate. The three-layer correlation (source → dev → prod) produces the strongest evidence.

### Authorization gate

- `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, `0.0.0.0`, `*.local`, `192.168.*`, `10.*`, `172.16-31.*` → **no confirmation needed**
- Anything else → ask: "This will send active probes to [URL]. You're authorized to test this target? [y/n]"

## Workflows

| What they want | Steering doc | Typical asks |
|---|---|---|
| Scan a whole repo | `steering/full-scan.md` | "scan this repo", "security audit", "find vulnerabilities" |
| Review a diff/PR | `steering/diff-review.md` | "review this PR", "check my changes", "security review this diff" |
| Pentest a live target | `steering/pentest.md` | "pentest this", "recon on target.com", "enumerate the app" |
| Hunt vulnerabilities | `steering/hunting.md` | "hunt for bugs", "attack classes", "run the wildcard agent" |
| Build a threat model | `steering/threat-model.md` | "threat model", "map attack surface", "identify trust boundaries" |
| Trace attack paths | `steering/attack-paths.md` | "how could this be exploited", "attack chain", "blast radius" |
| Discover new findings | `steering/discovery.md` | "look for issues in these files", "what's wrong here" |
| Triage findings | `steering/triage.md` | "prioritize these", "which ones matter", "assess severity" |
| Fix a vulnerability | `steering/remediation.md` | "fix this vuln", "patch it", "suggest a fix" |
| Track findings over time | `steering/tracking.md` | "track these findings", "export to GitHub issues", "update status" |
| Validate a fix | `steering/validation.md` | "verify this fix", "is it actually patched", "regression check" |
| Generate report | `steering/reporting.md` | "write the report", "summarize findings", "produce the final output" |

## Scripts

Utility scripts live in `scripts/` relative to this skill:

```bash
python3 scripts/<name>.py [args]     # Python utilities
node scripts/validate-findings.cjs <file>  # Schema validator
```

| Script | Purpose |
|--------|---------|
| `scan_db.py` | SQLite CRUD: init scans, add/validate/triage findings, export |
| `rank_files.py` | Score files by security relevance for discovery worklists |
| `pentest.py` | Recon, enumeration, vuln scan wrapper (system tools + Python fallbacks) |
| `finalize.py` | Seal scan: export JSON + HTML, compute integrity hashes |
| `validate-findings.cjs` | Validate findings.json against report-schema.json (zero deps, Node.js) |

## References

| File | What it governs | When to read |
|---|---|---|
| `references/report-format.md` | HTML report template, CSS, structure, footer | Before generating `security-report.html` |
| `references/finding-format.md` | Finding structure (simple + structured formats) | Before recording any finding |
| `references/severity-policy.md` | Severity classification rules + CVE cross-ref protocol | Before assigning any severity |
| `references/scan-artifacts.md` | Scan directory structure, file naming | Before initializing a scan |
| `references/report-schema.json` | JSON schema for structured findings.json | Before writing Phase 5 output |

**Report output is HTML** (`security-report.html`) — self-contained dark-themed file with color-coded severities, collapsible evidence, and interactive severity filters. No external dependencies.

---

## Anti-Patterns to Avoid

Erros que tornam auditorias de segurança inúteis:

1. **Listar tudo que desvia do OWASP como finding.** OWASP é checklist, não bug list. Toda aplicação real faz tradeoffs.

2. **Rating defense-in-depth gaps como HIGH/CRITICAL.** "Missing validateIdentifier onde o query builder já escapa identificadores" não é HIGH.

3. **Ignorar o deployment model.** Rate limiting no CDN layer é arquitetura válida. Nem toda app precisa rate limiting no application level.

4. **Tratar designed behavior como bug.** Entenda o trust model antes de auditar. Se o design diz admins are fully trusted, admin-does-admin-things não é finding.

5. **Padding o report com LOWs para parecer thorough.** Dez LOWs não fazem um report útil. Três MEDIUMs fazem.

6. **"Potential" findings sem proof.** Ou você pode explotar ou não pode. Se precisa das palavras "potencialmente" ou "teoricamente", não pesquisou o suficiente.

7. **Ignorar o que o codebase faz bem.** Se auth é sólido, diga. Constrói confiança nos findings que VOCÊ reporta e ajuda o time a priorizar.

8. **Construir exploits de assumptions incorretas sobre parser/runtime.** Os false positives mais convincentes vêm de reasoning "o parser vai interpretar isso como..." sem verificar. Se o exploit depende de parser behavior, cite a spec ou teste. Não assuma.

9. **Pular business logic e creative attacks.** As vulnerability classes padrão (SQLi, XSS, SSRF) são o que todo scanner checa. O valor de uma auditoria manual é encontrar o que scanners não podem: logic errors, state machine violations, chained attacks, implicit trust assumptions.

10. **Desistir fácil demais.** "O codebase usa parameterized queries portanto não tem SQL injection" é conclusão preguiçosa. Cheque CADA uso de sql.raw(). Cheque dynamic identifiers. Cheque search/FTS. Cheque se existe code path que bypassa o query builder. Insista.

---

## Hard Rules

These apply to every workflow. No exceptions.

1. **Respect the user's preferred language.** Report content in the user's language. HTML template structure stays as-is.
2. **Evidence or it didn't happen.** Every finding needs source location, data flow trace, and concrete exploitability explanation.
3. **Don't invent severity.** If you can't demonstrate impact, mark it as needs-investigation.
4. **Preserve scan state.** SQLite database holds progress. Never nuke it. Later runs pick up where you left off.
5. **Findings are immutable once sealed.** After finalization, original evidence record doesn't change.
6. **Relative paths only.** All file references use repo-relative paths.
7. **CVE severity ≠ real severity.** Always cross-reference against actual project usage.
8. **Follow reference specs exactly.** Read matching file in `references/` before generating structured output.
9. **Validate structured output.** Run `node scripts/validate-findings.cjs` before delivering findings.json.
10. **Adversarial validation is mandatory for full-scan.** Never skip Phase 3 or Phase 6.

---

## Report Compliance Checklist

Before delivering `security-report.html`, verify ALL against `references/report-format.md`:

### Structure (must exist in this order)
- [ ] `<title>` with repo name
- [ ] Meta grid: Repository, Date, Target, Methodology
- [ ] Summary cards (count per severity)
- [ ] Executive summary paragraph
- [ ] Filter buttons (Todos, Critical, High, Medium, Low, Info)
- [ ] Finding cards sorted by severity desc
- [ ] CVE analysis table (if deps have advisories)
- [ ] Pentest results section (if applicable)
- [ ] Negative results table — what was tested and found secure
- [ ] Remediation priority table
- [ ] **Footer**: `Generated by security-specialist skill by github.com/fabricioctelles/skills`

### Styling
- [ ] Dark theme, color-coded severity badges
- [ ] No external dependencies, works offline

### Content integrity
- [ ] All tests performed appear in report (positive AND negative)
- [ ] Evidence is actual output, not paraphrased
- [ ] CVE severities cross-referenced against project context
- [ ] Findings validated adversarially (Phase 3 passed)
- [ ] Confidence score present for each finding (full-scan)

---

## Lessons Learned

### CVE Severity × Real Impact: Always Cross-Reference

A CVE with CVSS 9.8 means nothing if the vulnerable code path is unreachable. Before classifying a dependency CVE, verify preconditions:

| Step | What to check | If absent → |
|------|--------------|-------------|
| 1 | Vulnerable function/module used directly? | Drop to LOW or INFO |
| 2 | Project uses the triggering feature? | Drop to LOW or INFO |
| 3 | Environmental conditions met? | Drop to LOW or INFO |
| 4 | DAST confirmed exploitability? | Flag as "not confirmed in production" |

### Three-Layer Correlation

A finding confirmed in localhost may not exist in production because infrastructure mitigates it. Always test both and document the delta.

### Storage Abuse is Underrated

Lack of input size validation on persisted fields is often missed. Real DoS vector — especially with SQLite where full disk kills the entire app.

### Multi-Run Coverage Strategy

Each run should explicitly target what prior runs missed. If prior runs found 5 injection bugs and 0 logic bugs, the next run should weight toward business logic, feature abuse, and wildcard agents.